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E￿ciency is considered a key factor when evaluating a bank’s performance. More-
over, e￿ciency enhancement is an explicit policy objective in the Single Market Di-
rective of the European Commission. But e￿ciency improvements may come at the
expense of deteriorating bank pro￿ts and excessive risk-taking. Both the quantitative
e￿ects and dynamic reactions of performance in response to e￿ciency improvements
remain often unclear on both theoretical and empirical grounds. We analyze the dy-
namic relations between e￿ciency and performance in the German banking market.
To this end we use panel data for all German banks for the years from 1993 to 2004
and estimate impulse response functions (IRF) derived from a vector autoregressive
model. The IRF estimate the response of a shock in e￿ciency on pro￿ts or default
probabilities. The former is estimated with stochastic frontier analysis, the latter is
estimated with a hazard rate model. The results indicate that a positive unit shift in
e￿ciency reduces the probability of default and increases pro￿ts. On the one hand,
we ￿nd evidence that the long-run impact of pro￿t e￿ciency on risk is larger than
for cost e￿ciency. However, cost e￿ciency impacts with a shorter time lag on the
probability of default. On the other hand, cost e￿ciency has on average a slightly
larger impact on pro￿ts than pro￿t e￿ciency.
Keywords: Bank performance, e￿ciency, bank failure, vector autoregression,
performance forecast.
JEL: C33, C53, D21, G21, G33, L25Non-technical summary
Cost and pro￿t e￿ciency are widely recognized as important determinants of
bank pro￿tability and risk. Empirical evidence on the magnitude and the dynamics
of these interdependencies, however, is virtually absent from the ￿nancial economics
literature. In this study we estimate the pro￿tability and risk reactions to e￿ciency
shocks (and vice versa). To this end we use a panel of German universal banks
between 1993 and 2004. A major problem in the model building process is that
e￿ciency itself is also driven by pro￿tability and risk. We therefore develop a panel
vector autoregression model in order to account for endogeneity.
With the exception of pro￿tability, measured as return on risk-weighted assets,
we cannot directly observe the variables of interest. Therefore, we estimate cost
and pro￿t e￿ciency (CE and PE) with stochastic panel frontier analysis and use a
bank’s probability of default estimated with a hazard rate model ( Score) as a proxy
for risk.
Both measures are employed in a two equation dynamic panel model. From
that we obtain coe￿cients for e￿ciency and performance equations regressed on
lagged endogenous, performance and e￿ciency measures, respectively. From here we
calculate impulse response functions (IRF) to quantify the magnitude and dynamics
of each e￿ciency-performance pairing for all four measures.
We ￿nd that positive e￿ciency shocks signi￿cantly improve bank performance in
subsequent periods. The e￿ect of PE improvements on risk and of CE improvements
on pro￿tability are largest. E￿ciency shocks impact with a time lag of only two years
on pro￿ts and decay rapidly thereafter. The same applies for the responses of risk
to cost e￿ciency shocks, whereas responses to pro￿t e￿ciency shocks display higher
lags of roughly four years. Compared to cost e￿ciency the overall e￿ects from pro￿t
e￿ciency shocks on risk are larger. Hence, banks that require immediate action
to reduce their probability of default may want to focus on improving their cost
management skills. Long-term reductions of risk seem more adequately targeted by
enhancing pro￿t e￿ciency.
In sum, improving e￿ciency reduces risk and boosts pro￿ts. This result is robust
across various speci￿cation choices and IRF indicate that the e￿ects are rather
persistent.Nichttechnische Zusammenfassung
Kosten- und Gewinne￿zienz werden im allgemeinen als wichtige Bestimmungs-
gr￿￿en f￿r die Ertragskraft und das Risiko einer Bank angesehen. Es gibt allerdings
kaum empirische Ergebnisse, die diesen Ein￿uss nachweisen oder in ihrem Ausma￿
und ihrer Dynamik bestimmen. Der vorliegende Beitrag hat das Ziel, den Ein￿uss
beider E￿zienzarten auf die Ertragskraft einerseits und das Risiko andererseits zu
messen. Dazu wird ein Panel aller deutschen Universalbanken aus den Jahren 1993
bis 2004 herangezogen.
Ein Problem bei der Sch￿tzung ergibt sich daraus, dass auch die Ertragskraft und
das Risiko die Kosten- und Gewinne￿zienz beein￿ussen. Um diesen Endogeni-t￿ten
Rechnung zu tragen, wird ein Panel-Vektorautoregressives Modell entwickelt. Ein
weiteres Problem entsteht dadurch, dass die verwandten Gr￿￿en in der Studie mit
Ausnahme der Ertragskraft, welche hier mit dem auf die risikogewichteten Aktiva
bezogenen Gewinn gemessen wird, nicht direkt beobachtbar sind und deshalb sep-
arat modelliert werden m￿ssen. Die Kosten- und Gewinne￿zienz werden mit einer
stochastischen Panel-Frontieranalyse bestimmt. Das Risiko einer Bank wird mit der
Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeit aus einem Hazardratenmodell gemessen. Aus den Vari-
ablen wird ein Zweigleichungs-Vektorautoregressives Modell gesch￿tzt, jeweils mit
einer E￿zienzvariablen (alternativ Kosten- oder Gewinne￿zienz) und einer Per-
formancevariablen (Ertragskraft oder Risiko). Um die Auswirkungen von E￿zienz-
schocks auf die Performancevariablen zu bestimmen, werden aus den Sch￿tzergeb-
nissen Impuls-Response-Funktionen f￿r 10 Zeitperioden berechnet.
Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass positive E￿zienzschocks in den Folgeperioden mit
einer signi￿kant h￿heren Performance einhergehen. Besonders hoch sind die Wirkun-
gen von Gewinne￿zienz auf das Risiko und von Kostene￿zienz auf die Ertragskraft.
Auf die Ertragskraft wirken E￿zienz-Schocks zwar mit einer vergleichsweise geringen
Verz￿gerung von etwa zwei Jahren, verlieren aber danach rasch an Wirkung. Auf
das Risiko wirken Kostene￿zienz-Ver￿nderungen ebenfalls rasch. Gewinne￿zienz-
schocks hingegen entfalten hier ihre Hauptwirkung auf die Risikosituation erst nach
etwa vier Jahren und sind in der Summe l￿nger anhaltend und wirkungsvoller als
Kostene￿zienzschocks. Eine m￿gliche Schlussfolgerung ist, dass Ma￿nahmen zur
Steigerung der Kostene￿zienz geeignet sind, auch sehr kurzfristig eine Verminderung
der Ausfallwahrscheinlichkeiten zu bewirken, w￿hrend sich substanzielle Risikore-
duzierung nachhaltig eher mittels einer Verbesserung der Gewinne￿zienz erzielen
l￿sst.
Zusammenfassend best￿tigen unsere Ergebnisse, dass E￿zienzverbesserungen zu
einem geringeren Risiko und einer h￿heren Ertragskraft beitragen. Dieser Befund
zeigt sich robust in allen unterschiedlichen Spezi￿kationen unserer Untersuchung.Contents
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7 Appendix 31E￿cient, Pro￿table and Safe Banking: An Oxymoron?
Evidence from a Panel VAR Approach 1
"An e￿cient Internal Market is essential for a prosperous economic fu-
ture, for our jobs and our living standards."
Charlie McCreevy, EU commissioner
oxymoron
/oksimoron/
noun a ￿gure of speech or expressed idea in which apparently contra-
dictory terms appear in conjunction
ORIGIN from Greek oxumoros ’pointedly foolish’.
Oxford English Dictionary
1 Introduction
On January 1, 1993 the Second Banking Directive was implemented by national
governments in Europe. It’s aim is to enhance competition and the e￿cient provision
of ￿nancial products and services in Europe (Benink, 2000). The objectives of the
European Commission (EC) have changed little since: to foster competition as to
further boost the e￿ciency of Europe’s ￿nancial industry (EC, 2005). Regulators
and practitioners, in turn, are also concerned with the performance of banks. In
particular, ￿nancial stability reviews by the Deutsche Bundesbank (2006) and the
European Central Bank (2006) monitor pro￿tability and risk. 2
But to a large extent the relation between bank e￿ciency and performance re-
mains a conundrum. After all, one fundamental theorem of welfare economics ne-
cessitates perfect competition for e￿ciency. More e￿ciency-enhancing competition
reduces prices to marginal costs, thereby reducing banks’ pro￿ts or even forcing
them out of the market. Alternatively, banks on the brink of exit may be inclined
to take excessive risks in an attempt to gamble for resurrection when exposed to
constant pressure to improve e￿ciency (Amel et al., 2004). Consequently, one may
ask whether we can have e￿ciency and ￿nancial stability as measured by pro￿table
yet reasonably risky banks at the same time (Gorton and Winton, 1998)?
A number of studies theorizes on the relation between competition and ￿nancial
1m.koetter@rug.nl (M. Koetter) and daniel.porath@wiwi.fh-mainz.de (D. Porath). We would
like to thank participants at the Economic Seminar Series at the University of T￿bingen and the
Supervision Seminar Series at Deutsche Bundesbank. We are grateful to Claudia Buch, Ferre de
Graeve, Sandra Eickmeier, Frank Heid, Robert Jung and Laura Spierdijk for helpful comments.
This paper is part of a research project funded by the ’Stiftung Geld und W￿hrung’. The paper
represents the authors’ personal opinions and not necessarily those of the Deutsche Bundesbank.
We are grateful for the provision of data. Any remaining errors are, of course, our own.
2The use of the words pro￿t and risk in the ECB’s latest Review provides anecdotal evidence on
these proxies’ importance: 847 and 2,158 times, respectively. E￿ciency is mentioned 1,719 times
and thus of importance, too. In contrast, the title word "stability" occurs only 589 times.
1stability implicitly assuming the former to enhance e￿ciency. 3 Two views juxtapose
each other. For example, Allen and Gale (2000; 2004) advocate the concentration-
stability notion. They argue that atomistic banking markets, and hence ceteris
paribus more competitive and e￿cient ones, are more prone to crises for two rea-
sons. Competitive markets are characterized by poor pro￿tability, which implies a
lack of bu￿er to absorb adverse shocks. In addition, supervision can be executed
more e￿ectively for a low number of banks compared to monitoring a system of
many intermediaries. This view is contrasted by the concentration-fragility view.
Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) also posit that increased concentration boosts pro￿ts
but highlight that market power also changes the conduct of banks. Speci￿cally,
their model results in excessive risk-taking of banks if higher interest rates can be
imposed on customers due to market power. Beck et al. (2006) tests the relation
between competition (as measured by concentration) and banking system fragility
(as measured by banking crises) between 1980 and 1997. In short, they de￿ne the
latter as periods when mean shares of non-performing total loans exceeded 10%.
They report results in line with the concentration-stability hypothesis, indicating
that further concentration as a response to increased competition actually stabilizes
￿nancial systems. However, Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) note that approaches using
relatively crude macroeconomic proxies for risk and competition may fail to cap-
ture important dynamics across banks. In this vein, they conclude that empirical
evidence, especially at the macroeconomic level, does not yield a clear picture so far.
Indeed, the micro economic variation across ￿rms, and even products, is at the
heart of an important contribution by Goodhart et al. (2006). They depart from
the most common assumption of a representative agent but allow for heterogenous
agents and product markets in banking. The suggested general equilibrium model
combines individual bank behavior, especially risk-taking, at the microeconomic
level with monetary and regulatory policy at the macroeconomic level. The latter
determine interest rates and costs of bank default. One core result is the endoge-
nous possibility of trade-o￿s between ￿nancial stability and economic e￿ciency. In a
companion paper, they forward numerical solutions from simulation exercises with
a simpli￿ed version of the complete model (Goodhart et al., 2004). Results cor-
roborate the previous conclusion of a possible goal con￿ict between e￿ciency and
performance. First, they ￿nd that monetary and regulatory policy are non-neutral
and in￿uence both bank pro￿tability and default penalties. Second, they ￿nd that at
the microeconomic level, heterogeneous agents and banks react di￿erently to shocks.
However, the authors caution carefully that especially the latter set of results de-
pends considerably on chosen starting values for their simulations and develop in
a hard to predict fashion. This suggests that the evolution of di￿erent aspects of
banking business, for example risk-taking on the one hand and e￿ciency on the
other, depend in a complex manner upon each other.
Apparently, the exact dynamics of how bank e￿ciency and performance relate to
3For example, theoretical models by Gorton and Winton (1998) and Perottia and Suarez (2002)
on the relation between competition and stability are both motivated by stipulating that deregula-
tion fosters competition and thereby the e￿ciency of the banking system. Empirically, the relation
between (market) structure, (￿rm) conduct and performance represents an extensive literature in
it’s own right. European banking market SCP studies are Bikker and Haaf (2002a,b) and Hempell
(2004). However, the SCP paradigm in itself is not beyond debate, see Bikker et al. (2006) for a
critical evaluation.
2each other remain contradictory at the least if not unclear. Despite the di￿erences
in ￿ndings, Allen and Gale (2004), Boyd and De Nicolo (2005) and Goodhart et al.
(2004) are united in their call for further research to provide empirical evidence
given the lack of consensus on theoretical grounds. Unfortunately, empirical tests on
the relation between e￿ciency and performance of banks are to a large extent also
re￿ections of the described ambiguity as we illustrate shortly. Therefore, we suggest
in this paper an alternative, agnostic empirical approach to provide evidence if
aiming at improved e￿ciency, higher pro￿tability and reasonable risk at the same
time indeed is an attempt to square the circle.
To this end we use a panel dataset of German banks. First, we estimate cost
and pro￿t e￿ciency scores with ￿nancial data. (In)e￿ciency is the deviation from
an optimal cost and pro￿t obtained from stochastic panel frontier analysis (SFA)
using ￿nancial data of individual banks. Second, we observe pro￿tability also from
bank-speci￿c ￿nancial accounts. Third, we develop a hazard model to estimate a
bank’s risk as the probability of default (PD). The hazard model in our context is
a rating model, which uses the correlation between a set of risk drivers observed in
a speci￿c period and the default state observed some time after. Thus, we measure
e￿ciency and performance directly at the ￿rm level instead of having to follow the
theoretical detour via competition.
Next, we need to appropriately deal with encountered endogeneity between e￿-
ciency and performance. Endogeneity means that e￿ciency and performance a￿ect
each other simultaneously. The contemporaneous feedback implies that shocks in ef-
￿ciency impact on performance and shocks in performance impact on e￿ciency. An
example of an e￿ciency shock at the macroeconomic level is the implementation of
directives enhancing competition, such as the abolishment of guarantee and mainte-
nance obligations by the government ("Gewaehrtraegerhaftung" and "Anstaltslast")
for savings banks in 2004 (IMF, 2004). At the bank level, a typical e￿ciency shock is
a restructuring program launched in period t. Presumably, such a program will not
only a￿ect e￿ciency but also pro￿ts of the current period. A typical performance
shock, on the other hand, is an economic downturn in a sector to which a bank’s
credit portfolio is exposed. The downturn will cause high loan loss provisions, lower
pro￿ts and a higher PD. Contemporaneously, the performance shock may impact on
e￿ciency, when the downturn induces the bank to enter in new sectors or markets.
The examples show that estimators for the impact from e￿ciency on performance
have to be derived from a simultaneous model. To our knowledge this paper is the
￿rst to explicitly address this simultaneity between e￿ciency, pro￿ts and risk.
A look on the data generation process con￿rms the necessity to account for the
interdependence of risk, return and e￿ciency. Performance and e￿ciency are both
calculated from data which refer to the same ￿nancial statement. For accounting rea-
sons, the di￿erent balance sheet and pro￿t and loss account positions are correlated.
For example, accounting rules imply that loan loss provisions are linked to pro￿ts,
which in turn are linked to equity capital. Data from all three accounts of the exam-
ple typically enter both, the e￿ciency variable and the performance variable (PD
or pro￿ts). Thus already from a static perspective, e￿ciency, PD and pro￿ts are a
conglomerate of correlated variables and are therefore correlated among themselves.
A third characteristic of our study is to account for dynamic interdependencies.
We consider a variety of lagged relationships between e￿ciency and performance
3since the e￿ects from either shock will not be con￿ned to one period only. In con-
trast, we expect complex patterns of contemporaneous and lagged interactions be-
tween both variables, which can hardly be modeled with a priori knowledge. A
way to deal with endogeneity and complex lag structures are vector autoregression
(VAR) models. VAR models were originally proposed by Sims (1980) as an alterna-
tive to structural models. The major di￿erence between VAR models and structural
models lies in the model building process. Structural models heavily rely on a priori
knowledge, whereas VAR models are more data-driven. 4 In our case, VAR mod-
els have bene￿ts compared to structural models because the relationship between
performance and e￿ciency is expected to be complex. At the same time there is
little (or no) a priori knowledge about the exact lag structure. In the following we
therefore estimate a (two-variable) VAR model for e￿ciency and performance.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. We set out with a brief review of
previous empirical work on the relation between e￿ciency and performance in section
2. In section 3, we introduce our theoretical concepts for estimating e￿ciency, pro￿ts
and risk and the IRF. In section 4 we describe the individual bank data provided by
the Bundesbank and the regional macroeconomic data which we additionally use.
In section 5 we present and discuss our results. We conclude in section 6.
2 Empirical work on e￿ciency and performance
In light of our study, empirical work on bank e￿ciency and performance can broadly
be classi￿ed into two groups. Studies that explain bank performance as a function of
e￿ciency and studies that specify an e￿cient frontier conditional on performance.
This observation alone indicates the necessity to account for interdependency on the
one hand and cautions to draw inference on causal relationship on the other.
Performance and e￿ciency The literature on bank PD estimation to approx-
imate risk is abundant and dates back to the 1970s 5 First generation bank rat-
ing models focused on cross-section techniques, such as discriminant analysis and
logit regression (Sinkey, 1975; Martin, 1977; Altman, 1977). More recent studies use
methods for panel or duration data (Cole and Gunther, 1995; Estrella et al., 2000;
Shumway, 2001). To our knowledge, Wheelock and Wilson (1995) provide for the
￿rst time evidence on the direct relation between e￿ciency and banking risk. On the
basis of ￿nancial ratios, which also include pro￿tability, and historical default data
they predict bank failures of Kansas state chartered banks between 1910 and 1928.
They use non-parametric, linear programming techniques to estimate ￿rm-speci￿c
e￿ciency much more directly compared to earlier studies (Charnes et al., 1978).
4Structural models aim to ￿t parsimonious models because coe￿cient restrictions are necessary
to identify the model. Imposing restrictions in our model is problematic due to unknown feedback
relations between e￿ciency and performance and, thus, potentially biased results. To avoid ’unreal-
istic restrictions’, VAR models estimate an unrestricted reduced form of the underlying structural
model, which allows for a maximum of feedback relations. Identi￿cation of the structure is then
achieved by imposing a minimum number of restrictions. Hence, VAR models are parsimonious
in the number of restrictions, but not in the number of reduced form coe￿cients estimated. This
allows the analysis of feedback relations and is therefore particularly suited for our purpose.
5A comprehensive overview on rating methods is (King et al., 2005).
4Their results yield that ine￿ciently managed banks are more likely to fail, thus pro-
viding evidence that higher e￿ciency reduces the risk of instability in the banking
industry.6 In turn, Pasiouras and Kyriaki (2006) seek to identify the determinants
of commercial bank pro￿tability in 15 EU countries between1995 and 2001. They
motivate their research by pointing out that "adequate" earnings are necessary to
ensure the stability and growth of banks and, ultimately, the economy. They specify
a fairly a-theoretical reduced pro￿t equation that includes bank-speci￿c variables
and controls for macroeconomic conditions and ownership type. In line with other
bank pro￿tability studies (Berger, 1993; Demirg￿￿-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2002),
they ￿nd that better capitalization, i.e. less risky banks, has a positive impact on
return on assets (ROA) and less e￿cient banks to exhibit also lower pro￿tability.
E￿ciency and performance Since it’s inception in the late 1970s, the bank e￿-
ciency literature expanded beyond limits possibly reviewed within the scope of this
paper.7 However, only relatively few studies followed a suggestion by Mester (1993,
1996) to control for performance, especially risk, during estimation. Rather than
including controls in the frontier itself, some studies attempt to identify what is fre-
quently coined determinants of e￿ciency by means of second stage analysis. They
ususally report a positive relation between e￿ciency and pro￿tability proxies, such
as return on assets or equity (ROE) and interest margins, and a negative relation
with risk proxies, such as poor capitalization or high non-performing loan shares
(Vander Vennet, 2002; Pastor and Pastor, 2002; Casu and Molyneux, 2003; Carbo
and Williams, 2003; Girardone et al., 2004; Das and Ghosh, 2006).
A ￿rst observation is that results are frequently inconsistent. Girardone et al.
(2004) report insigni￿cant coe￿cients for pro￿tability in many sub-samples and
that higher interest rate margins are negatively correlated with e￿ciency. Similarly,
Williams and Gardener (2003) ￿nd that e￿ciency depends negatively on interest
rate mark-up’s. This contradicts other ￿ndings of higher pro￿ts to be related to
higher e￿ciency. Likewise, results obtained by Casu and Molyneux (2003) yield
insigni￿cant relations between risk and e￿ciency and signi￿cantly positive in￿uences
of ROE on e￿ciency for only two years in their sample. Das and Ghosh (2006) ￿nd
a signi￿cantly positive e￿ect of ROA on e￿ciency but carefully note that the former
is endogenously related to e￿ciency and therefore instrument ROA. But in their
discussion it remains unclear why endogeneity is limited to ROA. We argue that
any indicator, either performance or e￿ciency, is based on ￿nancial annual reports
and may thus su￿er from similar problems.
This relates to a second critique on studies using second stage regression to "ex-
plain" e￿ciency.8 Any study of bank-speci￿c data ultimately extract information
6Most subsequent papers con￿rm that e￿ciency measures are signi￿cantly correlated with lower
probabilities of default and market exit through mergers in numerous countries (Wheelock and
Wilson, 2000; Focarelli et al., 2002; Koetter et al., 2006). However, studies using multiple frontier
e￿ciency measures report signi￿cant correlations for only a some (Worthington, 2002).
7Excellent introductions to parametric and non-parametric frontier methods are Kumbhakar
and Lovell (2000) and Ali and Seiford (1993), respectively. The development of bank e￿ciency
applications is reviewed by Berger et al. (1993), Berger (2003) and Amel et al. (2004).
8Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) note two further problems. First, 2nd stage regressors are as-
sumed to be uncorrelated with frontier elements in the 1st stage. If they are not, e￿ciency estimates
regressed in the 2nd stage are biased. Second, e￿ciency is identically distributed by assumption in
the 1st stage. Estimation of a functional relationship in a 2nd stage is then paradoxical.
5from the identical data generation process. Put di￿erently, measures for risk, prof-
itability, e￿ciency and other indicators all emerge from bank’s annual reports. Only
few e￿ciency studies attempt to address this issue explicitly. Kwan and Eisenbeis
(1997) estimate a simultaneous system of four equations to account for both risk
and e￿ciency being endogenously dependent. Three equations capture di￿erent as-
pects of risk and one speci￿es e￿ciency as a function of the former three. They
￿nd that less e￿cient banks are more inclined to take risks. At face value, one may
conclude that competitive pressure to improve e￿ciency may ignite excessive risk
taking. But Kwan and Eisenbeis (1997) also report that higher capitalization, i.e.
less risky banking, positively in￿uences e￿ciency. They carefully conclude that their
results do not only su￿er from low explanatory power in statistical terms, but also
that the economic inconsistency of results warrants future work on the presumably
more intricate relation between risk and e￿ciency.
In sum, empirical evidence at the microeconomic level measures risk, e￿ciency
and pro￿tability more directly compared to the macroeconomic level. However, re-
sults are mixed and the earlier lack of theoretical guidance as to the direction of
causal relations remains. The endogeneity inherent in the data generation process is
usually neglected, let alone the dynamics of a change in e￿ciency on performance.
Therefore, we derive ￿rst auxiliary measures of e￿ciency and performance as to
quantify subsequently the dynamic e￿ects of both respective measures with a panel
VAR approach.
3 Variable Generation and Methodology
3.1 E￿ciency
E￿ciency analyses benchmark individual banks relative to a market cost or pro￿t
frontier (Amel et al., 2004; Berger, 2003). Theoretically, the main function of a bank
i is to channel savings from surplus units to investors in need for funds (Sealey and
Lindley, 1977). Assuming perfect factor markets and cost minimization as objective,
banks demand input quantities x at given factor prices w to produce outputs y
such that costs C are optimal. To account for heterogenous risk pro￿les of banks,
we follow the convention in the e￿ciency literature and condition the production
technology T(y,x,z) on equity capital z. Solving this cost minimization problem
yields an optimum cost function C∗
i = f(yi,wi,zi). Observed costs are higher than
optimal costs either due to random noise or due to ine￿ciency. Cost ine￿ciency
results from the employment of too large quantities of factors given output and/or
a sub-optimal input mix given respective prices.
Humphrey and Pulley (1997) argue that cost e￿ciency alone fails to evaluate
the ability of a bank to generate pro￿ts. They emphasize the necessity to study
pro￿t e￿ciency, too. Most pro￿t e￿ciency studies use their alternative pro￿t model
where banks possess some output market power. This assumption is appropriate for
German banking given the regional demarcation of markets (Koetter et al., 2006)
and evidence of prevailing market power in regional credit markets (Hempell, 2004;
Fischer and Pfeil, 2003). Banks maximize pro￿t before tax, PBT = py−wx, subject
to T(y,x,z) and, in addition, a pricing opportunity constraint H(p,y,w,z), where
6p denote output prices. Note, that the ine￿ciencies arising from the cost side are
considered in this model, too. Banks choose input quantities and output prices and
pro￿t ine￿ciency leads to lower than optimal pro￿ts PBT ∗
i = f(yi,wi,zi). Since we
allow banks some price setting discretion within the boundaries of H(•), both cost
and alternative pro￿t frontiers depend on the identical set of independent variables.
We use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) to estimate cost and pro￿t functions as
well as cost and pro￿t e￿ciency (CE and PE).9 Recall that we are interested in the
long-run impact of e￿ciency shocks on performance on the one hand and long-run
reactions of e￿ciency to performance shocks on the other. It is therefore crucial to
specify panel stochastic frontiers that allow for time-variant ine￿ciency. We use the
translog functional form to write a cost frontier as: 10










αjk lnxijt lnxikt + εit. (1)
Here x consists of outputs y, input prices w, control variables z and a time trend
t. In any year t, a bank i can deviate from optimal cost C due to random noise vit or
ine￿ciency uit. To distinguish these two e￿ects, we specify a composed total error
εit. Cost ine￿ciency leads to above frontier costs and the total error is εit = vit+uit.
Pro￿t ine￿ciency leads to lower than optimal pro￿ts, thus leading to εit = vit −uit.
The random error term vit is assumed iid with vit ∼ N(0,σ2
v) and independent of
the explanatory variables. The ine￿ciency term is iid with uit ∼ N|(0,σ2
u)| and
independent of the vit. It is drawn from a non-negative distribution truncated at
zero. The αi’s are allowed to be correlated with yit,wit and zit (Greene, 2005).
Most studies estimate bank e￿ciency over multiple years. But only few exploit
the additional information contained in longitudinal data. Parameters of equation
(1) are estimated instead as a pooled cross-section. This is problematic since this
approach implicitly assumes that individual bank’s production is independent over
time, ine￿ciency uit is assumed to be independent of the regressors and point es-
timates of ine￿ciency are not consistent (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000). In turn,
most panel frontier application treat e￿ciency either as time-invariant (Bauer et al.,
1993) or impose substantial structure on the evolution of e￿ciency over time (Bat-
tese and Coelli, 1988). In light of our interest to assess the long-run behavior of
performance and e￿ciency, both model classes are inappropriate. First, we assume
by construction that shocks to performance lead to changes in e￿ciency. Hence,
any time-invariant modeling of e￿ciency is ill-suited to our ends. Second, we hy-
pothesize that e￿ciency shocks, such as restructuring programs, are likely to cause
deteriorating e￿ciency ￿rst and to yield gains only after some implementation pe-
riod. Consequently, the development pattern of e￿ciency should be allowed to be
non-monotonic.
Therefore, we use what Greene (2005) coins a ’true’ ￿xed e￿ects frontier model,
which has two main advantages. First, e￿ciency can develop unrestrictedly over
9Linear programming approaches are more sensitive to outliers due to the neglect of random
noise. Given well-known measurement problems with banking data (Mountain and Thomas, 1999),
we opt here for parametric methods.
10In case of the pro￿t frontier only the dependent variable changes from to lnPBT.
7time. The uit is not parameterized in any way as a function of time and may thus
exhibit virtually any development pattern for a given bank i. Second, systematic dif-
ferences other than ine￿ciency enter the bank-speci￿c e￿ect αi. In contrast to most
previous estimators, the latter is identi￿ed separately from the ine￿ciency term uit
(Polachek and Yoon, 1996). Greene (2005) demonstrates by a Monte Carlo experi-
ment a substantially improved performance compared to previous panel estimators.
We use the conditional distribution of u given ε to obtain bank-speci￿c e￿ciency
measures (Jondrow et al., 1982). A point estimator of technical e￿ciency is given by
the mean of uit given εit. Cost and pro￿t e￿ciency are calculated as exp(−uit) and
equal one for a fully e￿cient bank. In the pro￿t case, PE of 0.9 implies that a bank
realized only 90% of optimal pro￿ts that could have been realized with the identical
production plan. Likewise, in the cost case a CE score of 90% indicates that the
bank could have produced the identical output vector with 10% less operating cost.
3.2 Performance
We evaluate bank performance along two dimensions: pro￿ts and risk. The former
can be directly observed from ￿nancial accounts and we de￿ne our pro￿tability





In contrast to pro￿tability, risk is not observable and has to be estimated with an
appropriate model. We de￿ne risk as a bank’s default risk which can be assessed with
the probability of default (PD). Porath (2006) uses a time-discrete hazard model to
estimate the PD of German savings banks and credit cooperatives with a sample
similar to ours. Concerning the discussion of di￿erent rating models and the ￿nal
choice we therefore refer to his study and estimate a similar time-discrete hazard
model.
Like any rating model, a hazard model transforms a set of (mostly) bank-speci￿c
covariates observed in a given year t into the PD. The rating process can be thought
of as a two-step procedure where the ￿rst step yields the score as a weighted sum
of the covariates. The second step transforms the score into the PD with an appro-
priate link function. The score weights can be estimated with historical data of the
covariates observed in t and the actual state of default in t + 1. In such a setting
the average PD of all banks in t is a predictor for the default rate of all banks in
t + 1. The individual bank PD in a given year PDit is the probability that bank i
defaults within one year. The exact de￿nition of default is largely determined by the
available data. In our dataset a default event is any event indicating that the bank
is in danger of ceasing to exist as a going concern. 11 This de￿nition corresponds to
the supervisory objective to prevent insolvencies.
Since Porath (2006) ￿nds no signi￿cant di￿erences between di￿erent link func-
tions we use the logit link function, which is the most easiest to handle. We write
the time-discrete hazard model as:
11We provide details in section 4.
8PDit =
eScoreit
1 + eScoreit. (3)
Here, PDit denotes the probability that bank i will default in period t + 1 and




βjXit,j + λi0 + λ0t. (4)
Equation (4) is a linear function of the set of j covariates Xit,j observed for bank
i in period t and weighted with the parameters βj. Additionally, a set of time dummy
variables λ0t enters equation (4) in order to account for unobserved time-e￿ects. The
unobserved individual e￿ects λi0 are assumed to be random because the alternative
￿xed-e￿ects model requires a change of status of the observed endogenous variable
(Chamberlain, 1980). This would restrict the sample to defaulted banks.
Instead, the random-e￿ects model permits the inclusion of the whole sample in
the estimation. Here we use the population average model proposed by Zeger and
Liang (1986). The population average model estimates equations (3) and (4) with the
Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) after replacing the (unobserved) variable
PDit with a dummy variable Yit+1. Yit+1 takes the value of 1 if bank i defaults in
period t+1 and the value 0 otherwise. The time lag of one year between the dummy
variable and the covariates determines the forecast horizon. 12
Our covariate selection is in line with other bank rating studies (King et al.,
2005). We ￿rst allocate covariates to di￿erent categories of risk drivers, where the
latter follow the CAMELS taxonomy used by U.S. supervisory authorities and other
central banks to monitor and assess banks. The categories comprise Capitalization,
Asset quality, Management skill, Earnings, Liquidity and Sensitivity to market
risk. We then select the model which maximizes the discriminative power under
the restriction that it contains at least one variable of each CAMELS category. We
measure the discriminative power by the area under the Receiver Operating Char-
acteristics (ROC) curve. Typical to statistical rating analysis our dataset contains
a large set of similar variables. Capitalization, for example, can be measured with
many alternative ratios (e.g. Tier I capital per risk weighted assets , balance sheet
equity capital per balance sheet total, Tier II capital divided by risk weighted assets
etc.) which are variants of the same risk driver. In order to avoid multicollinearity,
we additionally require that the model does not contain variants of the same risk
driver.13
12The GEE method accounts for the unobserved individual correlation with the help of a working
correlation matrix which enters the estimation. We specify that all observations of one bank have
the same correlation, which is the standard exchangeable working correlation. The estimators are
asymptotically consistent even if the working correlation matrix is not correctly speci￿ed (Hosmer
and Lemshow, 2000).
13Additionally, we analyze the stability of the model with the help of hold-out samples and
separate estimations for di￿erent groups of banks.
93.3 Panel Vector Autoregressive Model
We ￿rst estimate the reduced form of the model. Since our data is a panel of indi-
vidual bank observations we have to estimate the reduced form with dynamic panel
estimation techniques. This means that we regress all endogenous variables on the
lagged endogenous variables. The reduced form VAR model is a stochastic multi-
equation system. We obtain parameters by regressing the endogenous variables on
the whole set of lagged endogenous variables. Analyzing e￿ciency and performance














α22jPerfit−j + λ2i0 + λ20t + e2it (6)
Here, Effit and Perfit capture one of our e￿ciency variables, CEit or PEit, and
performance variables, ROAit or Scoreit, respectively. We use Scoreit instead of PDit
because equations (5) and (6) are linear and the score is the linear transformation of
the PD. Combining both variables for each category results in a total of four di￿erent
speci￿cations for equations (5) and (6). The maximum lag order J of the right-hand
variables can be ￿xed with statistical means using the Akaike Information Criterion
(AIC) and the outcome from diagnostic tests. To account for the unobserved time-
e￿ects λ10t and λ20t in equations (5) and (6), we further specify year-dummies. We
handle the individual e￿ects (λ10i and λ20i) by applying the GMM estimation of
Arellano and Bond (1991) to equations (5) and (6). Note that the reduced from
depicted in equations (5) and (6) is a pure forecast model. As noted for example by
Sims (1980), this implies to refrain from analyzing individual coe￿cients of these
estimations since we are primarily interested in error terms to calculate impulse
responses below.14
To this end, we solve the estimated model and obtain the moving average (MA)
representation. This is done by recursive elimination of lagged independent covari-
ates. Note, that it is exactly this approach that necessitates stationarity of the
dependent variables Effit and Perfit (Maddala and Wu, 1999; Im et al., 2003).
The MA representation shows how the endogenous variables depend on the lagged
residuals from the reduced form. The MA representation equates Effit and Perfit
on present and past residuals e1 and e2 from the VAR estimation:
14One may regard the reduced form as a re￿ection of the true but unknown structural model.
The latter contains additionally contemporaneous cross-terms of the respective sister equation.
Thus, the structural model cannot be estimated due to a lack of identi￿cation and simultaneous
equation bias, as would be the traditional approach to devise an explanatory model. Instead, a
VAR approach proceeds by estimating and subsequently solving a reduced form. On this basis, the
solution of the structural model is obtained thereafter.














Under the endogeneity assumption the residuals will be correlated and therefore
the coe￿cients of the MA representation are not interpretable. The reason is that for
correlated residuals the ceteribus paribus condition is not reliable when interpreting
the coe￿cients. Thus, the residuals have to be orthogonalized. We orthogonalize the
residuals by multiplying the MA representation with the Cholesky decomposition
of the covariance matrix of the residuals. The orthogonalized, or structural, MA
representation then is:









































= P · P
0 (12)
The orthogonal residuals can be interpreted as shocks: 1it is a shock in e￿ciency
and 2it is a shock in performance. The coe￿cients in the equations (9) and (10) are
the impact multipliers and give the current response of the left-hand side variable
to shocks occurring j periods ago. The MA representation with orthogonal residuals
is also called impulse response function (IRF). The IRF gives the response of each
variable included in the model to shocks from each of the variables for individual
periods. For performance and e￿ciency the IRF provides estimates for the impact
of e￿ciency on bank performance for the whole set of periods. The coe￿cients of
the IRF are called impact multipliers because they measure the impact of a shock
in a single period. By accumulating the impact multipliers for all periods we obtain
the long-run multipliers which measure the overall response of performance to an
e￿ciency shock. IRF and long-run multipliers answer exactly the questions raised in
our study. We are primarily interested in the impact multiplier β21j, which re￿ects
the response of performance to a shock in e￿ciency for the di￿erent time horizons
j. But since there are no theoretically motivated priors, it also conceivable that
11e￿ciency responds to shocks in performance. An example for the latter kind of
shock could be a hike in credit defaults due to a random macroeconomic shock
such as a ￿ood in rural areas.15 The upshot of our model is that we can assess the
dynamic interdependencies between e￿ciency and performance with a minimum of
restrictions imposed.
The latter results from the orthogonalization of the residuals from the observed
residuals. The Cholesky decomposition involves imposing one restriction on the co-
e￿cients in the IRF because the matrix P results in an upper right element of zero.
As can be seen from equation (11) this implies β120 in equation (7) to be zero. The
kind of short-run restriction imposed depends on the order of the variables. When ef-
￿ciency is the ￿rst variable in the model, we impose the restriction that performance
shocks have no instantaneous impact on e￿ciency. In order to impose the instan-
taneous zero restriction on shocks from e￿ciency to performance, we additionally
estimate a VAR model where the order of the variables is reversed and calculate the
IRF function. In line with the previously mentioned lack of theoretical guidance, we
chose two alternative short-run restrictions regarding zero contemporaneous impact
multipliers of e￿ciency and performance, respectively: First, we assume that shocks
in e￿ciency do not instantaneously impact on the performance variable. Second,
we restrict shocks in performance to have no instantaneous impact on the e￿ciency
variable.
Both restrictions have di￿erent implications for the interpretation of e￿ciency:
In the ￿rst case, shocks in e￿ciency are identi￿ed as those shocks which do not
immediately change the performance pro￿le of a bank. In the second case, shocks in
performance are only those shocks without immediate impacts on e￿ciency. To il-
lustrate the implications of both di￿erent restrictions we again refer to the examples
of a restructuring program (e￿ciency shock) and the bank specialized in a sector
which experiments an economic downturn (performance shock). With the ￿rst kind
of restriction, all the contemporaneous impacts of the restructuring program are
entirely attributed to e￿ciency. In contrast, the contemporaneous e￿ects from an
economic downturn are not restricted. With the second kind of restriction, the eco-
nomic downturn is restricted to have instantaneous e￿ects on the performance only.
At the same time the restructuring program may induce contemporaneous shifts
on performance as well as on e￿ciency. Both restrictions have shortcomings which
may bias the results: The ￿rst restriction ignores all instantaneous e￿ects from e￿-
ciency on performance and the second restriction ignores the instantaneous e￿ects
from performance on e￿ciency. Since there is no theoretical hint about which bias
is smaller we report IRF for both alternative restrictions and analyze whether the
results depend on the choice of the restriction.
4 Data and Auxiliary Results
We source our raw data from the Deutsche Bundesbank. It includes balance sheet,
pro￿t and loss account as well as audit reports for all universal banks operating in
Germany between 1993 and 2004. In addition, we have access to the default database
15As happened twice during this decade in East German areas on the banks of the river Elbe.
12of the Bundesbank for most of these banks between 1995 and 2003. On this basis,
we estimate e￿ciency and risk proxies, respectively.
4.1 SFA and e￿ciency
In line with the intermediation approach presented in section 3.1, we specify the
volume of funds channeled to agents in the economy as bank output captured by
interbank loans y1, commercial loans y2 and securities y3. To account for the increas-
ing importance of o￿-balance sheet (OBS) activities, we additionally follow Clark
and Siems (2002) and specify OBS as a fourth output y4. Subject to factor prices,
banks demand three factors to produce this output portfolio: ￿xed assets, labor and
borrowed funds. We approximate the price of ￿xed assets w1 as depreciation over
￿xed assets.16 Labor cost w2 are calculated by dividing personnel expenses over full-
time equivalent employees. The cost of borrowed funds w3 is captured by the sum of
interest expenses relative to interest-bearing liabilities, mostly deposits and bonds.
Finally, we include the level of equity as a control variable z.
Tables 8 and 9 in the appendix depict parameter estimates of equation (1) and
mean values and standard deviations of bank production and dependent variable
data between 1993 and 2004, respectively. First, note that during the sample pe-
riod the number of banks almost halved. As noted by Koetter et al. (2006), most
of this consolidation is due to mergers and acquisitions rather than voluntary exits
or outright failures. In fact, they show that higher ine￿ciency and lower perfor-
mance increases the likelihood of distressed mergers. However, the interdependence
of performance and e￿ciency as well as the dynamic e￿ects over a longer forecast
horizon remain unclear. Second, the importance to account for systematic di￿er-
ences between banks is underlined by large standard deviations of bank production
data.17
At the bottom of table 9 we depict mean CE and PE estimates from the ￿xed
e￿ect panel frontier model. Frontier diagnostics, such as a signi￿cant ratio of sys-
tematic to random variance λ, support the speci￿cation of both cost and pro￿t
frontiers.18 Mean CE is well in line with previous results reported for German, (Al-
tunbas et al., 2001), European (Vander Vennet, 2002; Berger, 2003), or U.S. banking
markets (Bauer et al., 1998).Our PE scores are somewhat lower compared to other
European or U.S. studies (Amel et al., 2004), but similar to those that use compa-
rable data sets and panel methods (Lang and Welzel, 1996; Koetter, 2006). Despite
growing bank production, rising total costs and consolidating markets, CE is very
stable over time. Apparently, relative performance was constantly monitored among
German banks. On the other hand, PE exhibits a rather volatile time pattern in
16Mountain and Thomas (1999) criticize that most bank e￿ciency studies approximate theoret-
ically exogenous factor prices with bank-speci￿c expenditures. Here, we calculate input prices that
banks face in regional markets (Koetter, 2006).
17One may argue that excessive heterogeneity requires the estimation of separate frontiers. How-
ever, comparing e￿ciency derived from di￿erent samples is not possible (Coelli et al., 2005). For
example, 80% CE may be very good relative to one benchmark, but very poor in another peer
group. Thus, we estimate a joint frontier and account for heterogeneity with bank-speci￿c e￿ects.
18Log-likelihood ratio tests also support the translog functional form with a time-trend.
13table 9 while pro￿tability continued to plummet since 1993. 19 Apparently, even in
a period of steadily declining absolute pro￿tability, the relative pro￿t e￿ciency of
banks di￿ered considerably.
The apparent lack of correlation of both e￿ciency measures is well-documented
in the literature (Bauer et al., 1998) and underlines our approach to analyze both
e￿ciency measures’ in￿uences on pro￿tability and risk. Simple descriptive statistics
indicate to us that the long-term e￿ects of shocks in the former are anything but
clear ex ante and therefore call for the VAR approach chosen here. Beforehand, we
turn to the estimation of our hazard model as to obtain risk proxies.
4.2 Hazard model and PD
To estimate the hazard model, we ￿rst have to de￿ne default events. While studies
of U.S. banks can rely on fairly clear failure criteria (Cole and Gunther, 1995; DeY-
oung, 2003), most non-U.S. studies have to approximate failure on the basis of some
￿nancial ratio’s threshold. In contrast to the latter, we can observe failures from
the records of the supervisory authorities at the Bundesbank. The occurrence of six
di￿erent events is recorded and classi￿ed as distress by the authorities. First, the
announcement of situations that may indicate a restriction to the bank as a going
concern according to ￿29(3) of the banking act. Second, a decline of the operating
earnings ratio by more than 25%. Third, the announcement of losses in excess of
25% of liable capital. Fourth, capital injections by the respective pillars’ insurance
schemes. Fifth, a takeover serving restructuring purposes. Sixth, forced closure of
the bank following a moratorium. Note, that the Bundesbank does not actively in-
tervene in any of these events but merely records defaults since it does not have
a legal mandate to, for example, close a bank or dismiss managers. Any legally
binding interventions are conducted by the Federal Supervision Agency of Financial
Services (’Bundesanstalt f￿r Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht, BaFin’ ). However, the
Bundesbank conducts the ongoing supervision of banks and closely cooperates with
the Ba￿n. Therefore, our de￿nition of default is in line with supervisory policy in
German banking and we can refrain from having to de￿ne some ultimately arbitrary
threshold level of a ￿nancial ratio. 20
Next, we select covariates to predict these failure events. We follow broadly the
CAMELS taxonomy described in section 3.2 and amend bank-speci￿c covariates
to capture the health of the corporate sector and bank market structure of banks’
regional markets. Our dataset does not contain variables that adequately measure
liquidity and management skill.21 We therefore restrict the analysis to the categories
capitalization, asset quality, earnings and sensitivity to market risk. In total, our
model contains nine variables. Since we specify lags for each covariate of two years
to predict default events, our resulting sample contains 21,599 observations between
19Mean return relative to total outputs declined from 100 basis points in 1993 to just 50 basis
points in 2004. Poor pro￿tability trends apply to all banking pillars (Koetter et al., 2006).
20In contrast to, for example, U.S. banking markets, none of the banks in the sample fell below
the legally required minimum capitalization levels (Koetter et al., 2006). Hence, approximating
default on the basis of ￿nancial data alone seems inappropriate.
21The Principle II liquidity reports are not available for the entire period and the management
quality of a bank could be assessed with qualitative information collected in on-site inspections.
141995 and 2003. Out of these, we observe 550 defaults. Using these data for failure
events and explanatory variables, we estimate equations (3) and (4) as described in
section 3. Parameter estimates and mean covariates for distressed and non-distressed
observations are depicted in table 1. The former are highly signi￿cant and display
the expected sign. The area under the ROC curve amounts to roughly 0.76 which
indicates a good discriminatory power.
Table 1: Parameter estimates Hazard model and mean covariates
Variable Coe￿cients Mean of x
(1) (2) (3) non-distress distress
Equity ratio c1 -0.098*** 6.0 5.7
Securities a1 -0.030*** 22.9 19.0
Bad loans a2 0.015*** 22.1 27.3
Operating result e1 -0.022*** 30.5 14.1
Loan-loss provisions e2 0.003* 29.2 388.6
Stocks s1 0.035* 1.6 1.9
Fixed income s2 0.0218*** -22.0 -15.1
Corporate insolvency INS 0.610*** 0.8 0.8
Bank market share MS -0.013*** 15.2 11.7
Pro￿t e￿ciency PE -0.004 -0.013*** 32.7 31.2
Cost e￿ciency CE 0.006 -0.015** 69.9 69.3
Without e￿ciency: χ2 380.62***
ROC 0.760
With PE: χ2 382.19***
ROC 0.760
With CE: χ2 379.51***
ROC 0.759
E￿ciency only: Wald χ2 74.79*** 69.69***
ROC 0.596 0.588
Observations 21,599 21,599 21,599 21,049 550
Notes: Population average model estimated with GEE; Year-dummies included; Banks: 3,332; Observations: 21,599;
ROC is the area under the Receiver Operating Characteristics-curve; ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ denote signi￿cant at the 1,5 and 10
percent level. All variables measured in percent. c1: Equity capital and undisclosed reserves to balance sheet total,
a1: Total securities to total assets, a2: Provisioned loans and loans with increased risks to audited loans,
e1: Operating results to balance sheet total, e2: Provisions to operating results, s1: Stocks to balance sheet total,
s2: Fixed-rate liabilities less ￿xed-rate assets to balance sheet total, INS: Corporate insolvency ratio
per district (’Kreis’) MS: Total asset market share per district (’Kreis’)
Consider the baseline results in column (1) of table 1 ￿rst. We measure capital-
ization c1 with the equity capital ratio. Equity capital here also contains undisclosed
reserves. The negative sign of the coe￿cient indicates that increasing equity capital
ceteris paribus lowers risk. Asset quality is measured with the ratio of total secu-
rities22 to all assets a1 and the ratio of provisioned loans or loans with increased
risk to the total of audited loans a2. The negative impact of securities on PD can
be explained with a lower risk of securities compared to other assets. The opposite
applies to provisioned loans or loans with increased risk, which exhibits a positive
coe￿cient in table 1. We capture the earnings situation with operating results di-
vided by balance sheet total e1 and the share of provisions of the operating results
22Including primarily money market and ￿xed income assets.
15e2. As expected, the former enter the model with a negative sign. Higher operating
results ceteris paribus improve a bank’s ￿nancial health. In turn the latter indicates
increased risk as witnessed by a positive coe￿cient. Sensitivity to share price ￿uc-
tuations is measured with the share of stocks to the balance sheet total s1. The
rationale for the positive sign of the coe￿cient is the positive correlation between
the volume of stocks and the exposure to stock market price risk. The exposure
to interest rate risk is captured by the net ￿xed interest rate liabilities s2, which
also is positively correlated to default. Both ratios are rather simple compared to
the market risk indicators developed in recent years. However, more sophisticated
ratios were not available for the whole sample and the whole set of banks. The ￿rst
regional control variable is the corporate insolvency ratio per district ( ’Kreis’) INS.
It controls for the quality of the regional asset market and is linked to credit risk.
The second regional control variable is the mean market share per district. It ac-
counts for market power and therefore may be linked to both market risk and credit
risk. Both variables presumably have a signi￿cant in￿uence on default because many
German banks operate on regionally con￿ned markets.
We also analyze the discriminatory power of e￿ciency. To this end we ￿rst add
the variables cost and pro￿t e￿ciency to the hazard model, respectively, as depicted
in column (1) in the second panel of table 1. In both cases we ￿nd no signi￿cant
relation.23 But a hazard model with e￿ciency as the only covariate yields a signi￿-
cantly negative impacts of pro￿t e￿ciency in (column 2) and cost e￿ciency (column
3). Hence, e￿ciency alone is a helpful predictor for defaults but the predictive infor-
mation is completely contained in other ￿nancial ratios. This result underpins the
endogeneity of a bank’s PD, performance and economic indicators such as e￿ciency.
While e￿ciency itself is signi￿cantly correlated with bank defaults, the eminent
threat of default for the chosen prediction horizon can be retrieved more directly
by alternative ￿nancial indicators. These, in turn, may in fact follow structural in-
e￿ciencies of a bank. This endogeneity between e￿ciency and other ￿nancial ratios
thus supports our approach to use VAR-modeling and seems to be an appropriate
way to gain insight into the dynamic relationship between e￿ciency and risk.
5 Results
We discuss ￿rst speci￿cation tests for the VAR model and present next our results
regarding shocks and responses of e￿ciency and performance, respectively.
5.1 Speci￿cation
Lag order The ￿rst step in VAR-modeling is to determine the appropriate lag order
J of the reduced form given in equations (5) and (6), respectively. Lutkepohl (2005)
suggests to estimate models with di￿erent lag orders and then to choose the model
with the highest lag order that passes the diagnostic tests. We estimate the reduced
form with the Arellano-Bond-GMM (AB) estimator for the lag orders of J = 1,...,4
(Arellano and Bond, 1991) in table 2.
23Coe￿cient estimates for other covariates hardly changed, as did explanatory power depicted
by ROC values in the bottom panels of table 1.
16Table 2: Optimal lag order J for the reduced form VAR
Lag Arellano-Bond autocorrelation test 1) Sargan AIC
J AR(1) AR(2) AR(3) AR(4) χ2
E￿ciency equations
CE on Score and CE 1 -16.585*** 2.961* 215.8*** -0.2
2 -15.286*** 1.121 0.921 198.0* -100.0
3 -13.609*** 1.675 -0.306 -0.691 176.3 -179.7
4 -12.521*** 0.660 0.043 -0.386 155.2 -234.8
CE on ROA and CE 1 -16.919*** 2.379* 127.9 -88.1
2 -15.365*** 1.593 0.349 115.8 -182.2
3 -14.668*** 2.923** -0.975 -0.803 110.2 -245.8
4 -13.122*** 1.200 -0.770 0.066 115.7 -274.3
PE on Score and PE 1 -34.152*** 2.736** 307.7*** 91.7
2 -32.976*** -1.292 1.522 252.4*** -45.6
3 -30.085*** 2.142* -2.078* 1.183 216.5* -139.5
4 -27.279*** 2.181* -1.394 1.564 201.8 -188.2
PE on ROA and PE 1 -34.623*** 2.101* 252.8*** 36.8
2 -33.832*** -2.207* 1.893 213.3*** -84.7
3 -31.034*** 1.232 0.268 0.773 185.6 -170.4
4 -28.477*** 2.977** -2.639** 2.887** 160.2 -229.8
Performance equations
Score on Score and CE 1 -2.935** -0.705 543.7*** 327.7
2 -3.363*** 2.927** -1.398 310.7*** 12.7
3 -9.681*** 2.525* -0.362 1.951 235.1* -120.9
4 -10.219*** -0.905 -0.999 1.996* 199.7 -190.3
ROA on ROA and CE 1 -2.262* -0.958 168.1*** -47.9
2 -2.308* 1.327 -1.570 214.1*** -83.9
3 0.967 0.858 0.311 -1.371 296.4*** -59.6
4 1.023 0.304 0.073 -0.042 215.8 -174.2
Score on Score and PE 1 -3.020** -0.650 532.6*** 316.6
2 -3.247** 2.820** -1.345 307.8*** 9.8
3 -9.304*** 2.970* -0.456 1.950 271.6*** -84.4
4 -10.188*** -0.606 -0.982 2.009* 235.5* -154.5
ROA on ROA and PE 1 -2.285* -0.957 183.6*** -32.4
2 -2.289* 1.284 -1.586 192.9** -105.1
3 0.994 0.862 0.438 -1.300 229.8** -126.2
4 1.044 0.293 0.167 -0.116 135.3 -254.7
Notes: AB-GMM two-step estimation with time-dummies; ∗,∗∗,∗∗∗ signi￿cant at 5%, 1% and 0.1%.
Degrees of freedom for Sargan test for lag order j=1,..,4: 108, 149, 178, 195, respectively.
1) (Arellano and Bond, 1991)
We report the AIC, the Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions and the
Arellano-Bond tests of autocorrelation for the whole set of our variables. 24 We de-
pict results from the e￿ciency equations in the upper panel and those from the
performance equations in the bottom panel.
The AIC criteria unanimously advocate the maximum lag order of four. In most
cases the Sargan test also turns insigni￿cant for higher lag orders. 25 Therefore, we
focus on the models with J = 4.26 Table 2 shows that the residuals from the re-
gression of PE on ROA and PE are autocorrelated. When reducing the model to
smaller lag orders the autocorrelation seems to vanish. This is counterintuitive, since
increasing lag orders should come along with reduced autocorrelation of the residu-
als. Potentially, this result is attributable to a loss of degrees of freedom. Except for
24We use the two-step estimator for regression diagnostics and the one-step estimator for infer-
ence about coe￿cients because t-ratios of the former estimator are unreliable (Bond, 2002).
25The only exception is the regression of Score on Score and PE. Tests for autocorrelation of
higher order than four lags are infeasible due to sample size.
26Note that the AB estimator takes di￿erences of the variables in equations (5) and (6). This
introduces a ￿rst-order MA-component in the model. As a result, signi￿cant test statistics of ￿rst
order autocorrelation do not indicate a misspeci￿cation.
17three speci￿cations all remaining 4th-order models pass the autocorrelation test. 27
Overall the results con￿rm that the model with four lags is optimal.
Stationarity As noted in section 3.3, our approach of solving the reduced form
to obtain the structural MA representation requires that the dependent variables
are stationary. Therefore, we test all four measures for panel unit roots for one up
to four lags. Since our panel is unbalanced we use an augmented Dicky Fuller test
in the vein of Maddala and Wu (1999) rather than the Im-Pesaran-Shin test (2003).
The according tests statistics are depicted in table 3.
Table 3: Fisher test for panel unit roots
E￿ciency Performance
Lag Statistic CE PE Score RoA
1 χ2 16,700 15,900 15,100 14,500
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
2 χ2 11,600 10,800 9,804 11,000
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
3 χ2 9,546 8,279 7,661 8,706
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
4 χ2 5,902 5,638 2,748 6,103
p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Our results pertain that we can reject the hypothesis of non-stationarity for all
four series. While this does not imply per se that resulting IRF are reasonable,
stationarity is a necessary condition for our methodology. Consider therefore next
the respective shocks and according responses of both e￿ciency and performance,
respectively.
5.2 Shocks and responses
We calculate two separate Impulse Response Functions (IRF) for each e￿ciency-
performance pairing depicted in ￿gures 1 through 4, respectively. The ￿rst impact
multiplier restriction (IMR) entails that the instantaneous impact multiplier of per-
formance in the equation for e￿ciency is zero. The second IMR is that the instan-
taneous impact multiplier of e￿ciency in the equation of performance is zero. We
also show 90%-con￿dence intervals for the IRF. 28 To ease interpretation, we further
divide the coe￿cients in equation (9) by β110 and the coe￿cients in equation (10)
by β220. The transformed coe￿cients represent the response to unit shocks. 29 The
27The speci￿cations Score on Score and PE and on Score and CE as well as PE on Score and
PE, respectively, yield signi￿cant autocorrelation of higher order than one, albeit only at the 5%
percent level.
28For the calculation of the con￿dence intervals we randomly draw 1,000 sets of values for the
coe￿cients in the VAR model with the estimated mean and standard error and calculate the IRF
afterwards based on this model. The 90% con￿dence interval is then given by the 5% and 95%
percentile of the simulated IRF distribution.
29We also calculated IRF on the basis of shocks of one standard error. Results are qualitatively
not a￿ected.
18corresponding long-run multipliers (LRM) are reported for each of the four pairings
investigated, too.30
Cost e￿ciency shocks We are most interested in the performance responses to
shocks in e￿ciency. Consider to this end ￿gure 1, which depicts the relations between
CE shocks and both Score and ROA responses, respectively.
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Impulse Response Function
Regarding the dynamics of a CE shock on risk as measured by Score, consider the
IRFs in the upper panel of ￿gure 1. Independent of the chosen restriction, both
exhibit large responses in the period after the occurrence of the shock. Afterwards
the responses continuously and rapidly decay. Responses ￿nally turn insigni￿cant
after about four periods. The empirical evidence therefore con￿rms the role of ef-
￿ciency as an e￿ective target when aiming at lowering a bank’s risk. Our results
for cost e￿ciency improvements thus support the view that the political objective
of enhancing e￿ciency does not jeopardize the average riskiness of German banks.
This is corroborated by odds ratios calculated from the long-run multipliers, which
we report in table 4. For CE the odds ratio implies that a unit shock lowers the
odds to default by about 10 to 20 percent. This underpins that targeting e￿ciency
improvements can yield substantial and sustained reductions of risk.
Apart from reducing risk, a shock in CE furthermore improves bank pro￿tability
considerably as shown in the bottom panel of ￿gure 1. Shocks reach their maximal
impact approximately after one year, wear out very rapidly and do virtually not exist
anymore after the second period. While the restriction choices lead to somewhat
30As noted earlier, long run multipliers are calculated on the basis of the estimated reduced
form model. While the latter is ill-suited for direct inference due it’s forecasting nature, we depict
individual parameter estimates for completeness in table 10 in the appendix.
19Table 4: Long run multipliers: Cost e￿ciency and performance
Shock in Impulse on IMR1) on LRM2) OR3)
CE Score CE -0.253 0.777
CE Score Score -0.155 0.856
CE Pro￿t CE 0.436
CE Pro￿t Pro￿t 0.369
1) IMR: Instantaneous Multiplier Restriction; 2) LRM: Long-run
multiplier; 3) OR: Odds Ratio equal to OR = eLRM.
di￿erent evolution paths of ROA in the immediate aftermath of a CE shock, the
short-run nature of e￿ects is robust for both. The cumulative e￿ects for shocks from
cost e￿ciency are approximately 0.4. Thus, cost e￿ciency improvements lead to an
immediate increase of pro￿ts but only to limited long-run e￿ects.
In sum, both impulse-response functions and long-run multipliers show that in
all periods where the responses are signi￿cantly di￿erent from zero, higher cost
e￿ciency lowers risk and increases pro￿ts. The choice of restrictions seems to be of
minor importance for most of our results as witnessed by similar long-run multipliers
for the di￿erent restrictions reported in table 4.
Pro￿t e￿ciency shocks A number of bank e￿ciency studies demonstrate that
cost e￿ciency alone may not re￿ect the full picture of bank’s ability to manage
their business appropriately in competitive markets. European banking studies em-
phasizing the importance to analyze also pro￿t e￿ciency are, for example, Altunbas
et al. (2001) or Maudos et al. (2002). They argue that ongoing deregulation and
increased competition from non-bank ￿nancial intermediaries necessitates not only
e￿cient cost management. It is at least equally important to supply a vector of out-
puts in correct proportions. In the same vein, much of the legislative initiatives to
create a level playing ￿eld in European banking aim especially at increasing pro￿t
e￿ciency in the sense of providing customers with the desired range of ￿nancial ser-
vices at optimal prices. But, for example, the European Central Bank (2005) point
out that such pro￿t e￿ciency improvements imply increased pressure on margins,
thereby reducing pro￿ts. E￿orts to enhance e￿ciency may even induce excessive
risk-taking in an attempt to defend market shares. To assess the consequences of a
shock to PE consider ￿gure 2.
Instantaneously, the impact of a shock in PE on risk is small and even declining
during the ￿rst years. However, e￿ciency changes exhibit a high persistence and
reach their maximum after four years. The long-run e￿ect on score is about -0.4
(for the restriction on PE) and -0.3 (for the restriction on Score) according to our
results shown in table 5. As for cost e￿ciency, we also report the odds ratios and
￿nd that a unit shock in PE lowers the odds to default by about 25 to 35 percent.
Thus, pro￿t e￿ciency has a larger impact on PD compared to cost e￿ciency. On
the other hand, cost e￿ciency impacts immediately on PD while the e￿ects from
pro￿t e￿ciency unfold completely only after four years. A possible policy implication
from this ￿nding is that cost e￿ciency is an appropriate target for banks that aim
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to reduce their risk immediately. In contrast, pro￿t e￿ciency seems preferable for
enhancing the long-run risk pro￿le of a bank.
Table 5: Long run multipliers: Pro￿t e￿ciency and performance
Shock in Impulse on IMR1) on LRM2) OR3)
PE Score PE -0.408 0.665
PE Score Score -0.284 0.753
PE Pro￿t PE 0.298
PE Pro￿t Pro￿t 0.257
1) IMR: Instantaneous Multiplier Restriction; 2) LRM: Long-run
multiplier; 3) OR: Odds Ratio equal to OR = eLRM.
With respect to pro￿tability, PE shocks mimic the dynamics of cost e￿ciency
shocks. The e￿ects on ROA reach their maximal impact after one year and vanish
quickly in subsequent periods yielding an overall e￿ect of 0.3. Thus, both types
of e￿ciency improvements come along with an immediate increase of pro￿ts. The
long-run e￿ects from cost e￿ciency, however, are larger compared to pro￿t e￿ciency.
Cost e￿ciency responses By means of examples we considered so far e￿ciency
shocks, which may either emanate from macroeconomic or microeconomic changes.
An example of the former are deregulation e￿orts such as the introduction of a single
banking license in Europe. An example for the latter are restructuring programs or
replacement of incumbent managers. However, we need to acknowledge that none
of these examples is founded in theory. In fact, it is also perfectly conceivable that
performance shocks occur and e￿ciency changes in response to that. Due to this
lack of theoretical guidance, which exists in macroeconometric VAR applications,
for example, by modeling monetary shocks, we also report results for cost and pro￿t
e￿ciency responses to performance shocks, respectively. In the top panel of ￿gure 3
21we depict to this end CE responses to a unit shock in Score.
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In contrast to the reverse relation of shocks in CE and resulting Score responses
depicted earlier, our results show that a shock in risk actually increases CE sig-
ni￿cantly for up to ten years. While the dynamics di￿er slightly according to the
choice of restriction (see right panel in ￿gure 3), the bottom line remains quali-
tatively robust. This response of e￿ciency to shocks in Score may re￿ect banks’
e￿orts to change e￿ciency when performance is deteriorating. Increasing risk comes
along with a long-run increase in cost e￿ciency, which peaks after approximately
three years before the responses decline slowly thereafter. Apparently, banks focus
on improving their ability to provide ￿nancial services cost e￿ciently after having
experienced a shock in PD.
Table 6: Long run multipliers: Performance and cost e￿ciency
Shock in Impulse on IMR1) on LRM2)
Score CE CE 0.398
Score CE Score 0.287
Pro￿t CE CE 0.137
Pro￿t CE Pro￿t 0.522
1)IMR: Instantaneous Multiplier Restriction; 2)
LRM: Long-run multiplier; 3)OR: Odds Ratio equal to OR = eLRM.
The response of CE on pro￿tability shocks regarding both the shape of the
impulse response functions and the magnitude of the long-run multipliers depicted
in table 6 also di￿er across restriction choices. Short-run restrictions on e￿ciency
22lead to lower long-run multipliers (0.1 for CE) than short-run restrictions on pro￿ts
(0.5 for CE). Robust to the short-run restriction is that in all cases the impacts on
cost e￿ciency are positive, yet very volatile, and last around four years.
Pro￿t e￿ciency responses As can be seen from ￿gure 4, the reverse relation be-
tween Score and PE di￿ers from the reverse relation with cost e￿ciency. Increasing
risk has only small positive e￿ects on pro￿t e￿ciency. Impulse response functions for
both multiplier restrictions yield mostly insigni￿cant e￿ects after two years. Hence,
pro￿t e￿ciency seems to be hardly a￿ected by sudden changes in the risk pro￿le of
the bank.
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The responses of e￿ciency on pro￿tability shocks also depend on the choice of the
restriction, as indicated by di￿erent shapes of the impulse response functions and
the magnitude of the long-run multipliers. Short-run restrictions on e￿ciency lead to
lower long-run multipliers (zero for PE and 0.1 for CE) than short-run restrictions
on pro￿ts (0.2 for PE and 0.5 for CE). Robust to the short-run restriction is that in
all cases the impacts on cost e￿ciency are higher than on pro￿t e￿ciency and that
the overall e￿ect is positive. A positive impact from pro￿t shocks on e￿ciency sug-
gests that, in contrast to risk shocks, banks do not react to pro￿tability shocks with
e￿ciency enhancing measures. Potentially, these two dimensions of performance are
regarded as substantially di￿erent problems that each require alternative manage-
ment reactions.31
31For example, banks may indeed target e￿ciency after risk shocks but may try to acquire
market power through mergers (Amel et al., 2004), or boost sales by entering new markets after a
pro￿tability shock (Berger et al., 2003).
23Table 7: Long run multipliers: Performance and pro￿t e￿ciency
Shock in Impulse on IMR1) on LRM2)
Score PE PE -0.051
Score PE Score -0.150
Pro￿t PE PE -0.008
Pro￿t PE Pro￿t 0.182
1)IMR: Instantaneous Multiplier Restriction; 2)LRM:
Long-run multiplier; 3)OR: Odds Ratio equal to OR = eLRM.
But given the volatile pattern of e￿ects, their bare signi￿cance and the very low
magnitude, we are more inclined to hypothesize that the relation between pro￿tabil-
ity shocks and e￿ciency reactions is simply weak. Perhaps the long-run nature of
many e￿ciency enhancing measures, such as restructuring projects, is simply con-
sidered an inappropriate management tool to react to declining pro￿ts.
To sum up, our results con￿rm that e￿ciency is a powerful means to enhance a
bank’s performance. Both, cost and pro￿t e￿ciency shocks increase pro￿ts and de-
crease risk. Cost e￿ciency impacts with a shorter time lag on probability of defaults
than pro￿t e￿ciency at the expense of a lower long-run e￿ect. Cost e￿ciency, on
the other hand, has a slightly larger overall e￿ect on pro￿ts. By and large, results
are robust to the di￿erent restrictions used in our estimation and only pro￿tability
shocks and responses exhibit alternative dynamics subject to this choice.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we suggest a VAR approach to model and quantify the intricate in-
terrelations between bank e￿ciency, risk and pro￿tability. While our approach is
antithetic to recent theoretical developments of general equilibrium models, such as
in Goodhart et al. (2006), we aim to contribute complementary agnostic evidence
on the issue if e￿ciency gains and sustained performance are mutually exclusive
objectives. In short, we ￿nd for the German banking market that both objectives
do not contradict each other.
We use a sample of German universal banks between 1993 and 2004. On the one
hand, we measure cost and pro￿t e￿ciency (CE and PE) with stochastic frontier
analysis. On the other, we approximate a bank’s risk with a hazard model using
historical distress data provided by the Deutsche Bundesbank. These measures are
then employed to estimate a dynamic panel VAR. In line with theoretical predictions,
we ￿nd indeed that e￿ciency and performance measures exhibit complex interde-
pendencies. Both determine each other both contemporaneously and over time. To
quantify the long-term dynamic e￿ects of shocks in either of our measures, we calcu-
late impulse response function for a forecast horizon of ten years. Our main ￿ndings
are as follows.
First, we ￿nd that both kinds of e￿ciency improvements reduce risk and increase
pro￿tability. The largest cumulative long-term e￿ects are those of PE shocks on risk
and CE shocks on pro￿tability. Consequently, bankers are well-advised to target ef-
24￿ciency improvements since they can yield sustained and pronounced improvements
in pro￿tability and risk.
Second, the dynamics of shocks and e￿ects di￿er across our four e￿ciency and
performance measures respectively. While CE improvements reduce the risk of a
bank immediately, PE improvements fully unfold only after four years but impact
for as long as up to 10 years. Thus, bankers and/or regulators that see need for
immediate action to reduce a bank’s probability of default may want to focus on
cost e￿ciency. In turn, sustained risk reduction warrants a stronger focus on the
bank’s relative ability to maximize pro￿ts given its production plan.
Third, interactions between e￿ciency and performance are asymmetric. Higher
e￿ciency reduces risk, but increases in risk lead to higher e￿ciency, especially on the
cost side. This result suggests that bankers aim especially at cost e￿ciency improve-
ments, for example by means of restructuring programs, after having experienced a
risk shock. In turn, higher e￿ciency a￿ects pro￿tability positively and vice versa.
Thus, bankers seem to react only to shocks in their riskiness by improving e￿ciency
while pro￿tability declines are according to our results no spark to launch e￿ciency
improvements.
To our knowledge, our results provide for the ￿rst time empirical evidence about
the dynamic interdependencies of e￿ciency and performance. The quanti￿cation of
shocks and responses show that e￿ciency improvements are a useful target to im-
prove pro￿tability and reduce risk. Our ￿ndings suggest that e￿ciency enhancing
measures, for example the promotion of more competition, do not bear immediate
dangers of excessive risk-taking or sudden pro￿tability distortions. Our results re-
garding di￿erent timing patterns of these e￿ects may be of interest to policy makers
and regulators as well as bankers and consumers of ￿nancial services alike.
Clearly, this research is at the same time subject to a number of limitations,
which warrant future research. First, our model does not explicitly allow for conta-
gion e￿ects across banks. This is an important limitation when drawing inference
for policy-making at the macroeconomic level. Second, the VAR methodology sug-
gested here is completely a-theoretical. Future extensions should aim to follow the
developments of macroeconomic VAR modelling and devise structural VARs. Specif-
ically, augmenting the model for an explicit competition equation along the adjusted
PR-approach of Bikker et al. (2006) seems challenging yet promising in this respect.
Finally, our model does not account explicitly for (cross-border) bank market con-
solidation, which certainly is an important item on policy makers’ agendas, too.
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β p-value β p-value
lny1 0.559 0.000 0.403 0.000
lny2 -0.750 0.000 0.267 0.000
lny3 0.695 0.000 0.370 0.000
lnw1 0.613 0.000 0.246 0.000
lnw2 -0.090 0.108 0.108 0.000
lnz 1.211 0.000 0.020 0.444
0.5lnw1w1 0.034 0.000 -0.013 0.000
0.5lnw1w2 -0.330 0.000 0.097 0.000
0.5lnw2w2 0.639 0.000 -0.080 0.000
0.5lny1y1 -0.001 0.487 0.037 0.000
0.5lny1y2 -0.083 0.000 -0.104 0.000
0.5lny1y3 -0.021 0.000 -0.030 0.000
0.5lny2y2 0.034 0.000 0.083 0.000
0.5lny2y3 -0.078 0.000 -0.029 0.000
0.5lny3y3 0.102 0.000 0.058 0.000
0.5lnz -0.166 0.000 -0.011 0.002
lny1w1 0.016 0.000 -0.007 0.000
lny1w2 -0.037 0.000 -0.015 0.000
lny2w1 -0.109 0.000 -0.031 0.000
lny2w2 0.061 0.000 -0.027 0.000
lny3w1 0.056 0.000 0.023 0.000
lny3w2 -0.210 0.000 -0.074 0.000
lny1z 0.031 0.000 0.024 0.000
lny2z 0.108 0.000 -0.002 0.180
lny3z -0.057 0.000 -0.028 0.000
lnw1z 0.034 0.000 0.002 0.321
lnw2z 0.179 0.000 0.135 0.000
t -0.054 0.000 -0.037 0.000
t2 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.000
lny1t 0.005 0.000 -0.001 0.010
lny2t -0.007 0.000 0.005 0.000
lny3t 0.015 0.000 0.001 0.001
lnw1t 0.030 0.000 -0.005 0.000
lnw2t -0.036 0.000 0.024 0.000
lnzt -0.012 0.000 -0.007 0.000
σ 9.715 0.000 2.521 0.000
λ 31.982 0.000 22.233 0.000
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